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Abstract— The introduction of cross-compliance 
mechanism in the European Union with its 2003 CAP-
reform might affect the costs of production and thus 
competitiveness of the EU. Little evidence is available to 
asses the costs of compliance with regulations and it im-
plication for trade. In this study a farm level competi-
tiveness analysis of the impacts of the Nitrate Directive 
and the Identification & registration Directive focuses 
on the dairy sector in Germany, France, Italy, Nether-
lands and UK (within EU), and the US and New Zealand 
(outside EU). The findings from this study are inte-
grated into a trade analysis which assesses the impact of 
compliance costs on competitiveness of the various trad-
ing nations in global trade. Representative farm studies 
were used as a basis for the cost increase calculations. 
Best-estimates of compliance are used from the existing 
literature and expert judgements. The negative impact 
of these measures (for nitrates, and animal identification 
and registration) on EU imports and exports are less 
than 3 percent. If a smaller increase in compliance takes 
place, these already relatively small trade impacts will 
be further diminished. When the standards for nitrate 
pollution taken by the US and New Zealand are taken 
into account along with full compliance assumption in 
all countries analysed, this would only slightly improve 
the EU exports. The trade impacts obtained when no 
changes are assumed to happen in key competitor coun-
tries can thus be argued as providing the upper bound of 
the likely trade impacts. 
Keywords— Compliance, dairy sector, GTAP  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The 2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) introduced a number 
of adjustments to agricultural support. One of the most 
substantive changes was the introduction of a system 
of decoupled payments per farm (known as the Single 
Farm Payment). These decoupled payments were 
made conditional on recipients meeting environ-
mental, food safety, animal and plant health, animal 
welfare requirements as well as standards of good ag-
ricultural and environmental practice (cross-
compliance). Cross-compliance includes a large set of 
requirements, partly pre-existing, which potentially all 
might affect the costs of production and thus competi-
tiveness.  
In terms of international competitiveness, the EU’s 
presence on the world market is strong for all the ma-
jor dairy products: butter, cheeses, skimmed and 
whole milk powder. In 2005, the value of total dairy 
exports out of the EU was EUR 5.4 billion – for 2,5 
million tonnes of products. From EU-15, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and 
the Netherlands) make up 88% of the European export 
of dairy products. In the EU the dairy production 
represents the first largest agricultural sector (EC, 
2006). Quotas and environmental restrictions, how-
ever, have limited the EU’s dairy production; more-
over, its dairy manufacturing sector has tended to fo-
cus on specialty cheeses exported and sold at premium 
prices. Australia and New Zealand now control a 
growing share of world trade in dairy products. 
Would the global competitiveness of the sector be 
influenced due to increase in costs of compliance with 
regulations? Not much of evidence is available to 
asses the costs of compliance with regulations. The 
recent EU study assessing the administrative burden 
on farms arising from the CAP identifies that the 
cross-compliance controls represent 1% of the total 
 2 
12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
administrative costs (DG-AGRI, 2007), however costs 
could rise from changes in production strategies to 
comply with regulations. Kuik (2006) performs a re-
view of studies which estimate costs to farmers of 
measures to reduce nitrogen pollution in agriculture 
across Europe. The differences in costs per hectare 
from €6 to €236 are caused by industry structure 
(dairy, beef, pigs and poultry, crops, mixed), livestock 
intensity, historical rates of fertilizer application and 
the vulnerability of soils to nitrate leaching. In terms 
of the trade implications of environmental regulations, 
the previous research has mainly investigated the ef-
fects within the manufacturing sector (see e.g. Xu, 
2000; Le Roux et al., 2008 for an overview of studies). 
In agriculture, the work of Cassells and Meister (2001) 
is of direct relevance, which simulates the effects of 
compliance to water quality standards in New Zealand 
dairy sector.  
The contribution of this study is that it analyses the 
extent to which the imposition of farming standards, 
through the cross compliance system, gives rise to on-
farm costs which in turn affect the competitiveness of 
farm businesses with competitors on the world market. 
A farm level competitiveness analysis of the impacts 
of the Nitrate Directive and the Identification & regis-
tration Directive focuses on Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands and UK (within EU), and the US and 
New Zealand (outside EU) and integrates these find-
ings into the analysis of trade thereby assessing exter-
nal competitiveness. This analysis is of particular im-
portance in light of the CAP Health Check which was 
recently launched by the European Commission. Po-
litical decisions are likely to be highly influenced by 
debates about the relative costs and benefits of doing 
so. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 out-
lines the main steps undertaken in the analysis and 
explains motivations for the assumptions made 
whereas section 3 describes the data employed in em-
pirical work. Section 4 presents calculation of addi-
tional costs associated with three standards in selected 
EU countries. These cost assessments, scaled up to the 
sector level, are used for the external competitiveness 
analysis presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The concept of competitiveness has no unique defi-
nition and is used in a broad set of contexts and levels 
of aggregation (firm, product, country, industry). The 
methodological approach and design of this study is 
based on qualitative as well as quantitative modelling 
assessments, differentiating with regard to farm, sector 
and global levels of competitiveness.  
Farm competitiveness addresses the comparison of 
firms on one market: one firm is more competitive 
compared to one other if it can supply a product at 
lower costs, without affecting its overall profitability 
on the long term. In the case of farms, the profitability 
can therefore be approached by the farm’s gross in-
come (revenues and subsidies) minus the costs of vari-
able and (quasi-) fixed factors.  
If compliance to standards affects production costs 
at the farm-level, aggregate agricultural production is 
affected, shifting production from the most affected 
farm groups to the least affected ones. At the aggre-
gate level, these production shifts translate into a shift 
of the supply curve, i.e. a supply response. The supply 
response, on its turn, displaces the equilibrium be-
tween supply, demand and international trade. Differ-
ing standards and degrees of compliance to standards, 
and heterogeneity of farming conditions can change 
the market share of a trading partner within a sector. 
Market share between sectors is also affected, due to 
substitution and complementarity and spill-over ef-
fects between produced commodities in the economy. 
When considering potential cost implications due to 
the compliance with standards, it needs to be noted 
that implementation of standards varies considerably 
between Member States. Therefore the assessment of 
potential costs is done for particular member states. In 
addition, to assure comparability of competitiveness 
between EU and non-EU countries, implementation of 
comparable standards and potential cost implications 
is provided for New Zealand and USA. To account for 
effects that occur at farm as well as sector and econ-
omy level, the following four steps are taken in the 
analysis.  
In Step 1, the outcomes of seminars and discussions 
with experts and findings obtained from other projects 
and a literature review are used to establish the initial 
level of compliance to Nitrate Directive, the Identifi-
cation and Registration requirements and the food 
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safety issue (in particular the impact of prohibited use 
of milk yield growth promoters in the EU) and to sug-
gest the degree of possible improvement. The selec-
tion of the standards analysed is based on several con-
siderations: information about the importance of stan-
dards, best estimates of degrees of compliance and 
qualitative assessment of effects (marginal, limited, 
significant) and costs (negligible, low, and potentially 
significant) across standards, sectors and countries. 
The results of qualitative assessments for selected EU 
countries from Jongeneel et al. (2007) are used. 
In Step 2, a bottom-up approach was followed de-
termining the percentage cost increase due to compli-
ance starting from farm level. To define the number of 
affected dairy farms (animals) in the sector of each 
European country, density of livestock (≥2 livestock 
unites per ha)1 located in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
was approximated by dividing the total grassland area 
in the NVZs by the average land base (in hectares) of 
livestock farms. Subsequently this number is multi-
plied by the estimated share of specialized dairy farms 
in the total number of livestock farms, which yields a 
proxy for the number of dairy farms in the NVZ.  
Costs associated with achieving compliance with 
mandatory cross compliance standards can occur in 
the following ways:  
a) Investment costs: need to purchase new equip-
ment, build manure storage facilities, etc. 
b) Production costs: costs of replacement of eartags, 
labour costs needed for an application for a cattle 
passport in case of birth, to check animal identifi-
cation, keep registries up to date and archive them 
for 10 years, costs of manure management (trans-
portation and spreading, purchasing rights to 
spread on additional land), etc. 
c) Administrative costs: time needed to become fa-
miliar with new requirements/ procedures/ con-
trols (training events etc.); prepare controls and in-
spection time  
d) Non-compliance costs: deduction made from the 
SFP, potential loss of accreditation. 
                                                          
1
 Farms with lower densities than 2 LU/ha (‘extensive 
farms’) are assumed to face no significant cost increases. 
An exception are those extensive farms which are in a NVZ 
area, where they are assumed to in principle also face the 
record keeping costs (irrespective of their density). 
Thus, when accounting for additional costs associ-
ated with achieving compliance with mandatory stan-
dards, the above mentioned categories are assessed. 
During Step 3 an up-scaling procedure is employed 
to derive the percentage cost increase at the national 
level. In EU countries, the percentage costs increase as 
a whole is determined by a production weighted share 
of affected and non-affected farms. The exception to 
the above procedure concerns the estimates of compli-
ance to the Nitrate directive in Italy (based on case 
study in two provinces, see De Roest et al. (2007)). 
Under these assumptions the aggregation of costs to 
the national level is done for all sectors and countries 
which are used in modeling under step four. 
In Step 4, a multiregion, multisector, computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP (Global 
Trade Analysis Project), which is capable to take into 
account the various behavioural responses and related 
market adjustments, is exploited to determine the im-
pacts of increases in costs of production on the EU’s 
and other countries trade position. The GTAP-model 
of distinguishes 87 regions, 57 sectors and used re-
gional databases derived from individual country in-
put-output tables based on the year 2001. From the 
EU-15, only Member States which have an EU export 
share of more than 5% are made compliant to the 
standards. Other countries are too small to have an 
effect on the European competitiveness. The remain-
ing countries are aggregated into: (i) the rest of OECD 
(ROECD) countries and (ii) the rest of the world 
(ROW). 
There are a number of assumptions made in the 
model that are relevant to this study. The model as-
sumes rational profit maximizing producer behaviour, 
like most production models based on micro economic 
theory do. It is known however, that in agriculture 
farmers might, at least in the short term, behave some-
times in an adverse manner. This can imply that the 
burden of the calculated cost increases is partly or 
fully carried by family labor rather than passed on to 
buyers of farm products. To the extent that this phe-
nomenon yet occurs, the calculations given below are 
likely to give an upper bound of the impacts, where 
the really observed impacts on trade patterns might be 
smaller than the predicted ones.   
The model allows simulating the cost increase at the 
sector level by imposing a reduction in a sector’s fac-
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tor productivity, which could potentially be done for 
all primary input factors distinguished in GTAP. 
When a breakdown of costs is not available (into land, 
capital, unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital and 
natural resources), like in our case, the overall costs of 
production increase is proxied by total factor produc-
tivity shift (variable AO in GTAP notation). This 
means that the input requirements for producing a 
given level of output are assumed to be uniformly in-
creased.   
III. DATA 
The analysis is performed for selected EU-
countries, EU-15 as a whole, and such non-EU coun-
tries as US and New Zealand, which are important 
competitors of the EU in the dairy sector. The follow-
ing major data sources are used in the analysis. For a 
single EU country, the 2003 year data from specialized 
dairy farms (type 41) have been processed from the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The typi-
cal farm data in 2001 from the International Farm 
Comparison Network (IFCN, see Hemme, 2002) are 
used for farm competitiveness analysis, presented in 
Table 2. The advantage of these data is that they have 
been harmonized across countries and distinguish fam-
ily labour costs, thereby allowing focusing on the net 
results. The data for Italian specialized farms are not 
in the IFCN network before 2005. This lack of data is 
compensated by the case study (De Roest et al., 2007). 
For non-EU countries, the 2005 year farm as well as 
regional data were used from the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA), and Ministry of Ag-
riculture for New Zealand and regional authorities.  
The GTAP model version in this analysis uses 2001 
as a base year. Since the 2003 reform in the dairy sec-
tor was not yet accounted for, a price decrease in the 
base year of 2001 was introduced. The improvement 
in compliance is estimated as the change in compli-
ance as compared to 2005, the year for which best es-
timates of compliance could be obtained. The results 
of the GTAP model are then interpreted as estimates 
of improvement in compliance since 2005 are evalu-
ated as if they are happening in 2001 (the GTAP base 
year data). For this reason percentage changes as com-
pared to the baseline scenario are analysed and not 
absolute numbers.  
IV. EVALUATED STANDARDS AND COST 
IMPLICATIONS  
Three standards have been selected for detail analy-
sis of costs since these standards were expected to be 
most influential for the dairy sector, following the 
study of Jongeneel et al., (2007). Jongeneel et al., 
2007 conclude that none of the EU’s key competitors 
(the United States and New Zealand) has a system of 
requirements comparable to the EU’s one. A compara-
tive analysis covering all the themes addressed in the 
SMRs and GAECs shows that in general the intensity 
of regulation is less in these countries as compared to 
the EU. For the U.S. case the requirement to develop 
and follow a Comprehensive Nutrient Management 
Plan (CNMP) in order to comply with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's Clean Water Act regula-
tory requirements is analysed. For the case of New 
Zealand the effects of water quality regulations is 
studied. Although the policy-approaches in non-EU 
countries currently rely more on voluntary actions, 
more stringent forms of regulation might be intro-
duced in the future. Therefore scenarios simulating 
effect of the Nitrate Directive will consider changes in 
regulations for key competitor countries. 
A. Nitrates Directive 
The Nitrate Directive is perceived by farmers as one 
of the most restrictive standards facing EU dairy farm-
ers. The Nitrate Directive (91/676/EEC) was adopted 
in 1991 aiming at the protection of waters against pol-
lution by nitrate from agricultural sources. If land is 
located within a Nitrate Vulnerable Zone (NVZ), the 
farmer must comply with NVZ Action Programme 
Measures which limit the organic manure loading per 
hectare (250 kg total N on grassland in any NVZ and 
170 kg total N for non-grass crops in any NVZ) 
thereby limiting the disposal of manure by animals 
while grazing and require sufficient slurry storage fa-
cilities (or alternative arrangements) to cater for the 
closed period (see also Jongeneel et al., 2007 for fur-
ther details).  
In the US, the approach toward managing the envi-
ronmental impact from farming has been largely vol-
untary, or with compliance being a condition for cost-
sharing assistance with best management practices. 
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The Clean Water Act (CWA), which was originally 
focused on point sources of pollution, has been ex-
panded to non-point pollution, with agriculture identi-
fied as one of the key sectors. The farms that feed 
animals primarily in confinement are designated by 
Clean Water Act rules as Concentrated Animal Feed-
ing Operations (CAFOs) and are the focus of water 
quality regulations at the federal and state levels. 
However, it was not until 2002 that the federal gov-
ernment issued specific rules governing CAFO's, re-
quiring the design and implementation of a compre-
hensive nutrient management plan. CAFOs are treated 
as a regulation ‘similar’ to the EU’s Nitrate Directive. 
Since only 2 percent of all confined livestock opera-
tions are CAFO's, this policy currently only affects a 
minor (0.04%) number of dairy farms.  
In New Zealand effluent from the farm is to be dis-
posed on the land (after pounding) and fertilizer appli-
cations should follow a Code of Good Practice. The 
latter states manure discharge to be a controlled activ-
ity, where the rate of application may not exceed 
150kg N per ha annually (and no more than 50 kg ha 
within a period of 24 hours), buffer zones should be 
respected and runoff and pounding of effluent should 
be avoided. Because the issue of nutrients derived 
from intensive farming has become a big concern a 
private-public partnership tries to come up with self-
regulation (partnership includes nationwide dairy co-
operative Fonterra as well as regional councils). 
As follows from section 2, the bottom-up procedure 
was followed to assess the costs estimates starting 
from identifying the relevant number of dairy farms 
affected by the regulation (with a livestock density per 
hectare ≥ 2). Next, initial compliance levels, costs of 
compliance with the regulation for affected farms and 
the expected final degree of compliance are defined. 
As regards the cost measures for the selected EU 
countries we relied on per hectare cost estimates based 
on the Kuik (2006). The only exception to this is that 
the requirement to keep record of manure applications 
are (to our information) not yet included in the Kuik 
estimates. These are estimated to be €150 per (dairy) 
farm in a NVZ-area, and are added separately. To 
translate the percentage of additional costs of compli-
ance to total costs at the sector level, both affected and 
non-affected farms are accounted for. Additional costs 
of compliance for the affected farms are calculated 
taking into account the base year level and the as-
sumption about final degree of compliance. The costs 
at the farm and sector level are presented in Table 1 
(only selected countries are presented) along the three 
scenarios: (1) all farms improve their degree of com-
pliance in such a way that they all achieve full compli-
ance; (2) all affected farms improve their degree of 
compliance with 20% (to a maximum of 100%) as 
compared to the base year level (prevailing degree of 
compliance); (3) the degree of compliance is increased 
in general with 10% (as compared to base year level), 
and additionally no country will have a degree of 
compliance lower than 75%. For Scenario 1, the per-
centage increase in total production associated with 
the additional costs necessary to achieve full compli-
ance, varies between 0.099 till 6.8 percent of the total 
production costs. The absolute cost increases for this 
group varied from €419 per farm to €8837 per farm. In 
reality this effect might be somewhat lower, since 
(temporary) derogation provisions are not taken into 
account. Here it is assumed that at specialized dairy 
farms all production costs can be related to dairy pro-
duction. Moreover, it should be noted that many of the 
less intensive specialised dairy farms, as well as the 
non-specialized dairy farms are assumed to have zero 
compliance costs. The highest percentage cost increase 
was calculated for Italy on the base of a case study 
carried in two northern regions Lombardy and Emilia-
Romagna for dairy farms of different size and struc-
ture exercising various manure management systems 
(see De Roest et al., 2007). As regards the costs asso-
ciated with similar standards in New Zealand, the es-
timates from Cassells and Meister (2001) were up-
dated (see Meister, 2006). The farm monitoring data 
(MAF, 2005) providing data on categories of total 
costs (in terms of $/head of cow) are used for each of 
the 21 dairy regions in New Zealand in year 2005. 
Compliance costs relating to water quality regulations 
are calculated at the farm level for the land-based dis-
posal of dairy shed effluent. The percentage of farms 
that still had to comply for the period 2005/2006 is 
assessed to be 15%. Regional differences in average 
herd sizes and in consent and monitoring costs are in-
corporated into the analysis. Compliance costs at the 
farm level are then aggregated to obtain a total cost for 
the New Zealand dairy industry to comply with water 
quality regulations. From this total cost an estimate is 
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made of the compliance costs per kilogram of Milk 
Solids produced. The national dairy farm budget is 
used to calculate the percentage costs increase at the 
farm level which amounts to 3.2% (additional of 8.66 
cts/kg milk solids to the total of 2.77 $/kg milk solids). 
For the industry as a whole the percentage costs in-
crease is 0.5%, given that 85% of farms are already 
compliant.  
 
 
Table 1: Calculated cost of production increases in selected EU Member States due to compliance with the Nitrates Directive 
standard  
 
 
France Germany Italy 
Nether-
lands 
United 
Kingdom 
a Revised cost estimate €/ha dairy farms (using all previ-
ous studies), in prices of 2003 50.0 50.0 50.0 105.0 110.3 
b Per annum record keeping costs (€ per farm) 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 150.0 
c  Nitrate directive costs € per farm 6330 2119 11046 4694 8381 
d Total costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003 121.2 112.6 184.1 177.8 219.5 
e Estimated prevailing degree of compliance 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.75 0.95 
f % Nitrate directive costs/ 'corrected' total farm costs 
=e*c/d*100% 2.09 1.13 1.20 1.98 3.63 
g Share of specialized dairy farms in total milk production 
(based on output value) 0.05 0.23 0.85 0.79 0.52 
 Scenario 1: FULL COMPLIANCE     
h  Final level of compliance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
i Calculated additional costs per farm (associated with 
achieving full compliance)  =(h-e)*c 3798 848 8837 1174 419 
j % Additional costs per farm associated with full compli-
ance to Nitrate Directive    =i/d*100% 3.13 0.75 6.80 0.66 0.19 
k Approximated additional total sector cost increase (full 
compliance), %    =q*j 0.166 0.171 0.419 0.522 0.099 
 Scenario 2: 20% INCREASE IN COMPLIANCE  
l  Final level of compliance 0.48 0.72 0.24 0.90 1.00 
m  Approximated additional total sector cost increase, % 
=(l-e)*c/d*100% 0.022 0.051 0.398 0.313 0.099 
 Scenario 3: 10% INCREASE IN COMPLIANCE and COMPLIANCE >75%  
n  Final level of compliance 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.825 1.00 
o  Approximated additional total sector cost increase, %    
= (n-e)*c/d*100%) 0.097 0.064 0.288 0.157 0.099 
Source: own calculations following the procedure described above; based on data from EU-FADN, DG AGRI G3 and De 
Roest et al., 2007. 
 
Two typical dairy farms from Wisconsin and 
California were chosen for the analysis not only be-
cause they are the top two dairy states, but also be-
cause they represent two distinct milk production 
systems. Wisconsin dairy farming is typical of tradi-
tional smaller dairy farm (92 cows), whereas Cali-
fornian modern farm has 980 cows in 2006. For the 
calculation of costs per farm, costs of nutrient man-
agement, keeping costs, off-farm transport costs, 
land treatment and manure costs are accounted for 
amounting on average €7,308 per farm or €37 per 
animal on annual basis. Compliance with CNMP 
requirements costs on the typical Wisconsin dairy 
farm amounts to €1.37 per 100kg of milk produced 
(€0.31 per 100 kg in California). Based on the cost 
specification for 2 farms, this translates into an in-
crease of 4.19% in total production costs and 7.46% 
of direct costs (1.84% and 3.33% for California). 
Given the low percentage of farms which are subject 
to CAFO’s and that about 44% of farms are already 
compliant, the percentage costs increase at the na-
tional level averages to 0.02%. 
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Table 2: Farm structure and level of competitiveness in selected countries in 2001  
 New Zealand United States Germany France The Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
Codes as in Hemme (2002) NZ-229 NZ-835 US-70WI US-2100ID DE-68 DE-650 FR-30 FR-70 NL-51 NL-90 UK-100h 
Number of dairy cows, LU 229 835 70 2100 68 650 30 70 51 90 100 
Share grassland, % 100 100 54 62 40 32 80 26 95 81 100 
Milk production per cow, kg FCM 4200 4200 9900 9500 8049 8250 5863 7527 8326 8645 7531 
Costs per 100 kg FCM, US $            
costs for means of production 7.60 9.54 22.91 18.48 22.44 20.36 17.99 20.71 19.20 18.12 18.78 
labour costs 2.82 2.70 12.60 3.30 10.20 8.40 15.00 9.30 13.50 9.60 8.70 
land costs 1.74 1.44 1.80 0.18 1.80 2.00 3.00 1.44 3.12 2.52 2.88 
capital costs 1.75 1.54 1.96 2.59 2.38 1.96 2.06 2.10 1.82 1.26 1.96 
total costs  13.91 15.22 39.27 24.55 36.82 32.73 38.05 33.55 37.64 31.50 32.32 
    variable costs 9.00 12.68 24.55 22.91 20.45 28.64 17.18 18.82 13.09 11.45 18.41 
    fixed costs 4.91 2.54 14.73 1.64 16.36 4.09 20.86 14.73 24.55 20.05 13.91 
Revenue per 100 kg FCM, US $            
milk price 16.82 16.82 35.91 32.27 29.09 29.09 28.18 29.09 28.18 28.64 26.59 
other returns 2.27 1.64 3.68 3.20 2.69 2.67 3.60 2.43 3.78 3.64 1.42 
direct payments 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.16 1.31 1.96 1.31 2.21 0.49 0.82 2.54 
total revenue 19.09 18.45 40.41 35.64 33.09 33.73 33.09 33.73 32.45 33.09 30.55 
Results per 100 kg FCM in €            
gross margin (revenue – var.costs) 9.01 5.15 14.16 11.36 11.28 4.55 14.20 13.31 17.29 19.32 10.84 
profitability (gross margin – fix. 
costs) 4.63 2.89 1.01 9.90 -3.33 0.89 -4.42 0.16 -4.63 1.42 -1.58 
Additional costs of compliance to Nitrate Directive (see Table 1 for prevailing degree of compliance and further details)     
% Additional costs associated with 
full compliance to Nitrate Directive  3.2 3.2 4.20 2.00 0.75 0.75 3.13 3.13 0.66 0.66 0.19 
profitability at full compliance, 
€/100kg 4.23 2.45 -0.46 9.46 -3.58 0.67 -5.49 -0.78 -4.85 1.23 -1.64 
% in profitability -8.6 -15.1 -144.7 -4.4 -7.4 -24.6 -24.1 -578.2 -4.8 -13.1 -3.5 
gross margin, €/100kg 8.75 4.79 13.24 10.96 11.15 4.35 13.73 12.79 17.21 19.25 10.81 
% in gross margin -2.85 -7.03 -6.50 -3.60 -1.21 -4.22 -3.38 -3.95 -0.45 -0.35 -0.29 
Note: FCM is milk adjusted for fat content. Source: based on data from Hemme (2002) and Table 1.   
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The example for two US farms of different size 
with various cost levels and structure providing the 
range of farm costs increase from 2% to 4.2% 
clearly illustrates that compliance can have different 
effects on individual farm performance and thus in-
ternal competitiveness. The farm level competitive-
ness analysis summarised in Table 2 gives some in-
depth insights with respect to Nitrate Directive. Two 
typical farms from the countries under investigation 
were selected from the IFCN publication (Hemme, 
2002) to represent different size (small and large) 
and structure. The percentage rates of cost increase 
presented in Table 1 are applied.  
The costs and revenue data have been harmonized 
prior to analysis by the IFCN (measured in US $). 
The lowest line of Table 2 shows the impact of (full) 
compliance with the Nitrate Directive (or similar 
regulations outside the EU) on farm profitability and 
gross margin, bother are recalculated in EU €. As 
the table shows, small changes in costs can signifi-
cantly affect gross margin and (even more so) prof-
itability. The results for Italy are not presented in 
Table 2 since the data for Italian specialized farms 
are not in the IFCN network before 2005. As fol-
lows from the study of De Roest et al., 2007 per-
formed in two Northern regions Lombardy and 
Emilia-Romagna, milk production cost will due to 
the effects of the Nitrate Directive, increase by 8.4% 
in farms with 100 cows and by 6.7% in the larger 
ones (with 350 cows). Costs on farms in Emilia-
Romagna increase less than in Lombardy (per 100 
kg from € 35.74 to € 38.42 per 100 kg in Lombardy) 
since the number of animals in the area is signifi-
cantly lower that makes it possible to spreading ex-
cess manure for agronomic purpose on additional 
sites which are closer than in Lombardy. In the short 
run, application of the Nitrates Directive regulations 
to farms in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna may 
entail, in areas with a high animal concentration, the 
closure of less efficient or smaller farms. This will 
allow other farmers to use nearby lands suitable for 
manure and sludge spreading with reduced cost 
compared to use of farther lands. The fact that these 
farms produce less slurry and more manure will cer-
tainly help dairy farmers to dispose of waste more 
easily than pig farmers. 
B. Identification and registration of farm ani-
mals 
The EU Directives on Identification and Registra-
tion (I&R) of animals (92/102/EEG, and Regula-
tions 911/2004, 1760/2000, and 21/2004) is one of 
the most frustrating requirements to the farmers 
(DG-AGRI, 2007). By far most time consuming is 
the check of animal identification especially in ex-
tensive farms or in cattle breeding, as animals are 
often outside and in different fields and sometimes 
difficult to approach, compared to dairy cows kept 
indoors. I&R of farm animals has significant degree 
of non-compliance, with 30% non-compliance not 
being an exception. Besides, the inclusion of animal 
I&R results is very demanding for controlling agen-
cies (about 36 hours per farm for the RPA in Eng-
land or 40 hours for the AID in the Netherlands, 
who controls most SMRs and soil organic matter).  
The results of the cost estimates at farm level for 
five selected member states are presented in Table 3. 
First the total number of animals per farm is deter-
mined, assuming that per dairy cow about 0.8 num-
ber of other animals (heifers/bulls) is present at the 
farm. Moreover it is assumed that 95% of the dairy 
cows give birth to a calf, which has to be registered. 
In addition it is assumed that there is an eartag loss 
rate of 15%, which requires a proper and timely 
eartag replacement. The costs consist of the eartag 
costs and the labor (per animal) required for regis-
tration. 
The procedure of approximating the additional 
costs is similar to that for the Nitrate Directive. In 
all cases the estimated additional cost are below 
0.14%. Since the percentage cost increases related to 
the I&R directive are relatively marginal, other sce-
narios are not considered. 
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Table 3: Estimated costs of I&R for the dairy sector (€) for selected EU Member States 
Unit France Germany Italy 
Nether-
lands 
United 
Kingdom 
Number of specialized dairy farms (*1000) 63.7 73.6 40.8 21.7 21.6 
Average farm size specialized dairy farms 67.1 52.7 30.1 45.1 88.5 
Average number of animals/farm 76.5 77.7 81.8 114.2 158.6 
Estimated number of calves born 40.4 41.0 43.2 60.3 83.7 
Estimated eartag loss (15% loss rate) 11.5 11.7 12.3 17.1 23.8 
Labour costs per animal  1.75 1.75 12.00 1.75 * 
I&R costs per animal  (costs tags) 1.80 2.92 3.00 2.75 4.20 
Total I&R costs per farm 192.9* 246.0 831.8 348.3 451.4 
Total costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003, €1000 121.2 112.6 184.1 177.8 219.5 
Specialised costs (per farm) as in FADN database 2003, €1000 41.6 46.1 128.0 65.7 109.6 
Estimated prevailing degree of compliance 0.9 0.65 0.7 0.9 0.7 
 'Corrected' costs per farm (excluding  impl. Nitrate costs), €1000 121.0 112.4 183.5 177.5 219.2 
% additional costs I&R / 'corrected' total farm costs 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.06 
Note: For the UK no specific labour costs were distinguished. They are included in the costs per animal. 
*Fixed costs of €9 per farm in France are accounted for. 
Source: own calculations based on data from EU-FADN, DG AGRI G3. 
 
 
C. Food safety (hormone use) 
Consumer concerns as regards food safety have 
lead to hormone use prohibition in the EU. In the 
U.S. a recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), a 
growth hormone that stimulates milk production has 
been approved for use in dairy cows since 1994. 
Alongside the US BST (or rBST) is used by at least 
16 other dairy producing countries (Jarvis, 2002). 
The EU, Canada and Japan rejected legal BST use, 
and also within the US the technique was (and still 
is) controversial, at least within certain groups and 
regions. See Jarvis (2002, 103) for further details. 
Monsanto – the monopoly-supplier of the product 
(brand name: POSILAC) – reports that in 1999 
about 13.000 US dairy farms were using BST, ap-
plying it to 9 million dairy cows (approximately 
30% of the cows in supplemented herds). The use of 
this hormone leads to production increase and as 
follows from Tauer (2002), application of rBST in 
the first year may increase an average herd milk 
yield by 419-575 kg, whereas late adopters are able 
to directly realize a milk yield increase of about 
480kg/animal.year. Jarvis (2002) who analyzed the 
potential effects of BST on world dairy markets, 
estimates that the total US milk supply increased by 
3% due to the (pure) BST application2.  
Whereas BST will increase yields and thus reve-
nues it simultaneously increases input use (feed) and 
thus costs (including the costs/fee for BST use farm-
ers have to pay). In an ex-ante analysis Perrin (1991) 
estimated per unit cost savings varying from 0.5 to 
4.4 percent, although milk yields were increasing by 
approximately 15% (note the simultaneous cost in-
crease effect). Jarvis (2002, 109) using a slightly 
different approach provides a maximum per unit 
                                                          
2For comparative reasons note that the autonomous (genetic) 
milk yield increase is about 2% per annum. Where bST applica-
tion creates a one-shot increase, genetic progress creates a con-
tinuous milk yield increase. 
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cost decline of 5% (per unit average). When simu-
lating the trade impact of hormone use ban in the 
U.S. this 5% cost increase is assumed imposed on 
the U.S. 
V. STANDARDS AND EXTERNAL COM-
PETITIVENESS  
External competitiveness is analysed along seven 
scenarios. The first three scenarios in Table 4 simu-
late compliance to the Nitrate Directive in EU 
Member States at various levels of compliance (cor-
responds to Table 1). Scenario 4 simulates full com-
pliance within the EU to the Nitrate Directive and 
similar regulations in the USA and New Zealand.  
For the case of full compliance to Nitrate Direc-
tive in EU countries (scenario 1), the European dairy 
sector loses 0.71% of its export mainly to the rest of 
OECD and USA. Moreover, it increases its imports 
by 0.80%. As was already noted in the introduction, 
EU imports are playing a very limited role, and the 
main impact will be thus on exports. Since the 
GTAP model does not distinguish disaggregated 
dairy product markets, it is impossible to indicate 
how various product markets (e.g. butter, skimmed 
milk powder, whole milk powder, hard and soft 
cheeses, casein, etc.) will be affected. For example, 
the EU is known to export various speciality cheeses 
to the US market. The exports of such high value-
added products are likely to be less affected than the 
‘average’ dairy export product simulated within 
GTAP. The predicted export reduction of 0.70% of 
the EU to the US is therefore likely to be an upper 
bound. The extra imports may be an overestimation 
due to the way tariff rate quotas (TRQ) are modelled 
in GTAP. The other countries will increase their 
export in order to fill the gap the EU leaves. How-
ever, the total traded volume decreases with 0.05%, 
which is quite small. 
Table 4: Percentage changes in trade due to compliance to various standards 
Exports of which to… 
 
Scenario EU  
Import: 
total 
EU  
Export: 
total USA Rest 
of OECD 
Rest of  
World 
Total 
Trade 
1 Nitrate EU: 100% 0.80 -0.71 -0.70 -0.77 -0.70 -0.05 
2 Nitrate EU: +20% 0.51 -0.42 -0.45 -0.46 -0.40 -0.02 
3 Nitrate EU: +10%, minimum 75% 0.40 -0.33 -0.37 -0.37 -0.31 -0.02 
4 Nitrate EU and non-EU: 100% 0.30 -0.41 -0.63 -0.44 -0.38 -1.07 
5 I&R EU : 100% 0.21 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.14 -0.01 
6 I&R EU : 100% and Nitrate EU : 100% 1.01 -0.87 -0.89 -0.95 -0.85 -0.06 
7 Ban on hormone use in US: 100% -0.25 2.44 27.57 2.52 -0.80 0.24 
Notes: Regional impacts are presented for the situation of EU being a net exporter.  
Source: GTAP calculations. 
 
Because of the lower costs for European farmers in 
Scenario 2 and 3 compared to the first scenario (see 
also Table 1) there is a smaller effect on the com-
petitiveness of the European dairy sector. The de-
crease in export volume of 0.4% and 0.33% respec-
tively. Because of the smaller price effect on the 
world market the total traded volume only reduces 
with 0.02%. The rest of the OECD and the rest of 
the world fill most of the reduced European export. 
In scenario 4, when countries fully comply with ni-
trate measures, the total trade reduces substantially 
by 3.13% whereas the total export of the EU in-
creases by 1.08%, with the major (9.11%) exports 
increase to the U.S. Scenarios 5 and 6 report the 
simulation results of compliance of EU countries to 
the Identification & Registration standards. There 
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are no costs for non-EU countries and slightly in-
creased costs for EU countries resulting in the 
smallest of all the scenarios trade decline of 0.01%. 
A combined effect of full compliance of EU coun-
tries to Nitrate Directive and I&R leads to 0.6% loss 
of EU exports.  
The last scenario 7 is different from the previous 
ones in that it takes the EU standard not to use the 
BsT milk yield enhancing hormone as given and 
simulates the impact when the US would apply to a 
similar standard (which it currently does not). As 
such it provides some insight into the ‘opportunity 
costs’ to the EU of the US not adopting a similar 
standard. As it turns out, a hormone ban in the US 
mainly affects U.S. trade, and profits the EU dairy 
sector with an increase is exports of 2.4%. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
In this study the impact of compliance to stan-
dards on cost of production is estimated, using a 
farm level analysis and taking into account actual 
farm accountancy data. Rather representative farm 
studies were done and used as a basis for the cost 
increase calculations. Best-estimates of compliance 
are used, but these still contain a certain degree of 
uncertainty. In a number of cases alternative ap-
proaches and the different sources were used to 
cross-check both cost of production and degree of 
compliance estimates in order to test for the robust-
ness in terms of order of magnitude.  
As regards the impact of the Nitrate and Identifi-
cation and registration standards on production, 
clearly the Nitrate Directive has the most impact. At 
sectoral level for nitrate percentage cost of produc-
tion increases of 0.1 to 0.6% were found, with rates 
varying over countries and with respect to variations 
in the prevailing degree of compliance, as well as 
the assumed improvement in compliance. At farm 
level the Nitrate Directive might have even much 
stronger impacts than at sector level. As compared 
to the Nitrate Directive the estimated percentage 
costs increases associated with full compliance to 
the Identification and Registration standard was less 
than 0.15% and thus rather marginal. 
The impact of the Nitrate Directive on the EU’s 
external competitiveness can be described by the 
changes in diary exports and imports. Due to the 
relative cost increase associated with improved 
compliance to the Nitrate Directive, EU exports are 
projected to decline by a maximum of 0.71 percent, 
whereas imports increase by a maximum of 0.80%. 
So the overall effects are limited, with the impact on 
exports being the most important effect, since the 
EU is an important net exporter of dairy products. 
When a generic 20% increase of compliance to the 
current best-estimate level is assumed (rather than 
full compliance) these impacts shrink by 40 percent.  
The impact of an improvement of compliance to 
full compliance with respect to the Identification 
and Registration standard is projected to lead to a 
decline of EU dairy exports by 0.1% and an increase 
in EU dairy imports by 1.1 percent. 
When the measures on Nitrate taken by the US, 
Canada and New Zealand are taken into account and 
it is assumed that compliance to these measures will 
improve to full compliance, just like was assumed 
for the EU, this would slightly reduce the negative 
impacts on the EU’s trade flows. As such this under-
scores that in general the competitiveness impact 
analysis made for the EU is sensitive with respect to 
assumptions made about what happens with respect 
to standards in key competitor countries. In this spe-
cific case the impact of what other countries to im-
prove compliance with their current standards ap-
peared not to have a great impact. Since there were 
signals that the EU’s competitors face pressures to 
increase rather that to relax there standard-levels, the 
trade impacts obtained when no changes are as-
sumed to happen in key-competitors countries can 
thus be argued to provide an upper bound of the 
likely trade impacts.  
The combined impact of the Nitrate and Identifi-
cation and Registration standards on EU dairy ex-
ports and imports is estimated to be -0.87% and 
+1.01% respectively (given no changes in standards 
or compliance for other trade partners).   
The allowance of bST hormone use affects trade 
patterns creating currently a relative disadvantage 
for the EU’s dairy export position. A ban on bST 
hormone use in the US is argued to lead to a 5% 
percentage costs increase for US farmers, which ap-
pears to lead to a potential improvement of EU dairy 
exports by nearly 2.4 percent. Alternatively, the EU 
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food safety standard prohibiting the use of bST can 
be stated to have an opportunity cost in terms of for-
gone trade opportunities. 
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